Pax Americana: Omens for the 21st Century

Nothing new here I s'pose, just a rant on international relations, US power, and the 21st century. This is like a 'macropolitical' sequel to Pax Americana.

Pax Americana: Omens for the 21st Century

The post Cold War era has been characterized by supernationalism (the rise of the European Union and a common currency from the Thatcherite EC days; the WTO face off between the developed and developing world, and trade/ exim/ outsourcing arrangements that defy comprehension), a fundamental restructuring of the oil bloc, and a worsening rift between idealist policy and reality vis-a-vis the Middle East.

One could argue that this period of about a decade and a half has also seen the United States squander a lot of the political capital of the Cold War 'victory', and a lessening of its economic might due to the balancing rise of China, India, and the somewhat lesser hyped sovereignties from Europe, the Arab world, and South America.

The recent haplessness of the Bush administration in four distinct arenas further portends a coming change in the polarity of international relations. While not the most important clue to the workings of the coming century, it is nonetheless one I find most fascinating.

1. The most obvious and 'current' arena is Pakistan, where Pervez Musharraf's defiance puts George Bush's 'Freedom agenda' directly at odds with his misguided 'War on terror'. The prior seems Bush's, and therefore the United States' successor to the Truman Doctrine; the latter is the call to arms against the spectre of Islamic Fundamentalism that any sensible Joe will tell you was initially at least, being played out in the imaginations of post-9/11 west. Then in the best traditions of self-fulfilling prophecies, it became reality due to the misadventures in Iraq and to a lesser degree, Afghanistan.

2. Next is the belligerence of Turkey against the PKK and the Bush administration's lack of influence/ ability to do anything about it. Regardless of whether one sees it as mere bark or possible bite, an over-extended/ over-projected military force with at least one major unpopular engagement does not leave the US in a position of strength.

3. Then we go to a more subtle kind of arena, and one that has been a legacy of the Pax Britannica left in the care of those who would establish Pax Americana. I speak of course, of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and the whole Middle-eastern mess. While Olmert and Abbas of Israel and Palestine make all the right noises about the coming peace summit hosted by a US desperate for a foreign policy success, there is little hope of any lasting agreement.

At the same time, Israel's foiled aggression against Hizbollah of not so long ago underlines the fact that the complexity that is the middle eastern geopolitical situation is hardly solvable with hardware and brute force. As both Israel and the US are finding out, hard power comes to mean less and less in the information age, when faced with a sticky guerrila war.

4. Finally, a less subtle and perhaps more important neutering of US power comes from three not so unlikely comrades in arms - Vladimir Putin of Russia, Hu Jintao of China, and to a substantially lesser degree, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Socialists all, of a closet or explicit variety, two oligarchs, and all sitting pretty on the biggest oil-controlling power collectives outside of OPEC.

These symptoms, along with the other issues of the middle east and north-west asia contribute to making the US look like a bumbling, fumbling cyclops now at the mercy of many tiny Argonauts whilst other behemoths are rising.

The increasing economic and military might of China (PetroChina is now the world's biggest oil company by market capitalization incidentally) makes it the United States' natural competitor in matters economic and geopolitical. Japan, China, and a collection of oil rich states now own enough of the US national debt to give nightmares to any slightly paranoid citizen of that country.

Still a dwarf in comparison, but increasingly significant nonetheless, India in the past decade has begun exercising a more pragmatic foreign policy that turns on its head many compulsions and assumptions inherited from its socialist leaning 'non-aligned' past. India seems also to carry a lot more 'soft power' (goodwill, cultural influence, etc.) than China can manage with all its coercive 'hard power'. A result perhaps, of how much more palatable a democracy is to the west than a communist state.

As I've said before, I see America approaching the kind of situation the British Empire found itself in between the two world wars. The coming century could well see the fall of the US from its preeminence to the kind of affluent yet largely irrelevant status that some of the EU states currently enjoy.

But let us not be too swift in proclaiming the coming of the Asian era! The big variables that could end up beating everyone's expectations in my view are:

1. The next great resource - Imagine a time when Oil is replaced with some viable alternative. Or if more oil than we thought possible is located somewhere unexpected. Oil is power in this world, and the money follows oil. In years to come, this would be a big unknown that will obviously shape what comes.

2. Africa - Africa is the big black hole in any predictive models you can come up with. If for instance oil is found along the coast of or inside sub-Saharan Africa, I can scarce imagine the chaos that would ensue.

Largely ignored and left to its misery in the Cold War era, I firmly believe that after Europe in the 20th century and the Middle East at the turn of the century sooner or later the focus will move to Africa.

3. Revolution in China - While it seems unlikely now, one could never know which way the wind blows in a China that finds its politics somewhat at odds with its economics. Grassroots factors such as the internet which defies censorship at all turns could well cause a regime change sometime in the next century.

4. UN overhaul - Equally unlikely, but an overhaul of the United Nations to make it a more meaningful form of supra-national governance could be triggered by several factors - if global warming becomes even more acute and undeniable a problem, or if the oil price hits a hitherto unforeseen level due to scarcity, or if US power finally drops to a level where the world is left without a 'policeman', however flawed it may have been.

Conclusion

No conclusions really. :) This was just a recap of my world-view so you can ridicule it now, and so I can ridicule it a few years down the line when I revisit it.

Peace... Out!